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HOW TO REPAIR UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS
Omri Ben-Shahar*

Abstract
Several doctrines of contract law allow courts to strike down
excessively one-sided terms. A large literature explored which
terms should be viewed as excessive, but a related question is
often ignored—what provision should replace the vacated
excessive term? This paper begins by suggesting that there are
three competing criteria for a replacement provision: (1) the most
reasonable term; (2) a punitive term, strongly unfavorable to the
overreaching party; and (3) the maximally tolerable term. The
paper explores in depth the third criterion—the maximally
tolerable term—under which the excessive term is reduced merely
to the highest level that the law considers tolerable. This solution
preserves the original bargain to maximal permissible extent, and
yet brings it within the tolerable range. The paper demonstrates
that this criterion, which received no prior scholarly notice, is
quite prevalent in legal doctrine, and that its adoption is based on
powerful conceptual and normative underpinnings.
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HOW TO REPAIR UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS

INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following situation. As a student in a law school course, you
are regularly assigned a daily reading load of 20 pages in preparation for
the next day’s class. Today, however, you received an extraordinary
assignment of 200 pages, clearly more than you can feasibly prepare in
one day. What should you do? Should you resort to the normal,
“reasonable” practice of preparing 20 pages? Or should you, perhaps,
disregard the unreasonable command of 200 altogether and in the absence
of any other affirmative instruction read 0 pages? Or, perhaps yet, should
you disregard only the unreasonable increment of the command and
prepare the maximal tolerable level, of say, 50 pages?
This dilemma, I argue, is similar to one that is at the core of several basic
doctrines of contract law. When a party with bargaining power dictates a
contract term that is excessive or invalid, the law has to set a substitute
provision. Should the excessive term be replaced by the most reasonable
majoritarian term (analogous to 20 pages in the above hypothetical)?
Should the dictating party be “punished”— incentivized not to go too
far—by replacing the bad term with something least favorable to her
(analogous to 0 pages)? Or, should the excessive term be reduced merely
to the highest level that the law considers tolerable (analogous to 50
pages)?
This paper explores the problem of how-to-repair-excessive-terms and
illustrates its solutions in existing law. There is no single compelling
approach to this problem and, indeed, as Part I of the paper shows, all
three solutions can be traced across different contexts and legal traditions.
Still, the analysis in this paper focuses primarily on the third regime—the
one that intervenes minimally and reduces the excessive term only to the
maximally tolerable level. This regime received less analytical attention
than I think it deserves.
It might plausibly be conjectured, before reading this paper, that the
maximally-tolerable criterion is esoteric, an academic curiosity at best.
Surely, so goes the conjecture, if a court takes the trouble to correct an
excessive term in the contract, it would naturally replace that term with the
most reasonable alternative, not with a barely tolerable one. Why let a
party who overreached get away the maximum allowable advantage? The
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paper demonstrates, perhaps surprisingly, that the maximally-tolerable
criterion is quite prevalent. It shows how courts use it in a variety of legal
contexts as a mainstream solution to the problem of excessive and
unconscionable terms. One such doctrine is partial enforcement (and its
archaic predecessor, the Blue Pencil Rule), and its application in the
context of covenants-not-to-compete. I show that when non-compete
clauses are excessive, they are generally brought down to the maximally
tolerable level. Another doctrine studied here is unconscionability: what
do courts do when a term is struck as unconscionable? Quite often, it turns
out, the vacated term is replaced with the maximally tolerable one, most
favorable to the strong party. Yet another example involves the judicial
supervision of liquidated damages. In many legal traditions, excessive
liquidated damages are reduced to the maximally tolerable level—the
measure closest to the agreed sum, such that if it were the one agreed upon
in the first place, the court would have enforced it.
Before it surveys the doctrinal prevalence of the maximally-tolerable
criterion, the analysis in the paper sets up the context in which the
criterion operates, and provides a theoretical foundation for such regime.
Part I of the paper identifies the maximally tolerable regime as one of
three discrete and conceptually coherent solutions to the problem of
excessive terms. Part II of the paper then analyzes the conceptual
grounding of the maximally tolerable criterion—the legal principles with
which it is consistent and how it ties with other practices in various areas
of the law. It shows that what underlies the maximally tolerable term
approach is a specific conception of severability (or divisibility) of
contractual provisions, and that the principle of waiver can lead to a
similar solution. Further, this Part demonstrates the prevalence of similar
solutions in other areas of the law, outside contract law.
Part III of the paper offers a brief cross-doctrinal survey and invites the
reader to recognize that the maximally tolerable principle has broader and
more subtle application than one might expect. Recognizing the instances
in which this regime applies and when it is rejected sets the stage for the
normative inquiry in Part IV, which suggests several justifications for this
practice. The normative defense is anything but straightforward.
Admittedly, there is something objectionable about a legal rule that
accords the strong party, who already overreached in exploiting its
bargaining strength, the maximally tolerable term. Why not reform the
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contract more aggressively? If courts already step in, why not take the
opportunity to undo the effects of unfettered bargaining power? Legal
solutions that favor the weak party, that level the playing field, are usually
more appealing. Moreover, how do courts account for the bad incentives
that maximally tolerable terms generate—the incentive to draft excessive
terms, knowing that at most courts will only strike down the excrescence?
The key observation made here, in justifying the use of maximally
tolerable terms, is that the problem of repairing unconscionable contracts
is merely a species of gap-filling. The court that vacated an excessive term
has to decide how fill the newly created gap. If the court merely provides a
gap-filler, it cannot be too ambitious and it cannot undo (even it tries) the
existence of uneven bargaining power, or else its policy might backfire.
Indeed, the theme of this paper is part of a more general thesis concerning
a principle of gap-filling in contracts between parties that have unequal
bargaining power. This thesis, which I develop elsewhere, 1 suggests that
standard gap-filling approaches do not provide a workable prescription
when the gap in the contract involves a purely distributive aspect that
parties bargain over (such as price). Gaps of this sort cannot be filled with
“surplus-maximizing” terms because more than one term maximizes the
surplus—in fact, the choice of gap-filler is surplus-neutral. As it turns out,
gaps are purely distributive quite often. Ironically, many of the cases in
contracts casebooks that introduce the topic of gap-filling involve purely
distributive gaps over issues such as price, for which the prescription
“choose the terms that maximize the total surplus” does not provide a
definitive solution.
To resolve this indeterminacy, a new principle of gap-filling is needed, of
mimicking the bargain: the division of the surplus that would have been
struck between these parties, given the allocation of bargaining power. It
is not a mimic-the-parties’-will conception—there is no joint will to
mimic. Rather, it is a bargain-mimicking conception of gap-filling, which
requires courts to fill gaps with terms that are sensitive to the division of
bargaining power, more favorable to the party with the greater bargaining

1

Omri Ben-Shahar, “A Bargaining Power Theory of Gap Filling”, Mimeo. (University of
Michigan Law School, 2007).
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power. Any other method of filling gaps in distributive terms would be
undone by the parties, at an increased transaction cost.
Thus, continues my argument, if courts have to fill a gap that arises from
the elimination of an explicit (but excessive) term, the bargain-mimicking
conception would dictate the term closest to the hypothetical bargain.
More aggressive intervention would fail to achieve any redistributive
results that might superficially underlie it, and would be circumvented by
the parties while imposing some deadweight loss.
In the end, though, the paper recognizes that any normative justification
for the maximally tolerable rule must account for the incentive problem
and for the concern that this rule would induce strong parties to draft
excessive terms. The analysis concludes by showing that this concern
limits the application of the maximally tolerable regime, both in theory
and in practice.
This paper intends to fill a vacuum in the study of unconscionability and
related doctrine. Much ink has been spilled on the questions what is (and
should be) the threshold of unconscionability and when intervention is
justified. In the last decade this question returned to fore when various
types of mandatory arbitration terms were held to be unconscionable. But
no systematic discussions emerged regarding the “remedial” aspect—how
to repair contracts that contain excessively one-sided terms. This paper
provides a conceptual framework to consider this problem (by identifying
the three competing solutions) and takes a first shot at justifying one
possible solution.
I. THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE TERMS
A. Excessive Terms
When bargaining power is unevenly distributed, the strong party would
naturally use its bargaining leverage to draft one-sided, self serving terms.
It is a basic premise of contract law that courts ought not evaluate or even
inquire into the adequacy of consideration, however unequal the values
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exchanged.2 As long as a bargain was struck without coercion or fraud,
each party bears the consequences of its poor bargain.
But when the unevenness of bargaining power leads to terms that are
intolerable, courts are willing to step in. This might be true even for
simple, easy-to-understand terms such as price, although such instances
are extremely rare.3 Intervention is more likely to occur when the
excessive terms are less conspicuous than the price and are less well
understood by the weak party, suggesting that flaws existed in the manner
in which assent was reached. This may be the case for late payment terms
and late fees, disclaimers and exclusionary clauses. Intervention is even
more justified when the boilerplate terms frustrate the induced legitimate
expectations of the weak party—a phenomenon that is of particular
concern in insurance contracts.4 More recently, an increasing number of
courts find arbitration terms in consumer and employment contracts,
which are excessively favorable to the drafters (sellers or employers), to
contain unconscionable elements.5
The unconscionability doctrine is not the only way to limit excessive onesidedness in contracts. In some specific areas, terms that are drafted onesidedly may be struck without reference to the unconscionability standard.
For example, liquidated damages that are clearly over-compensatory are
considered punitive and unenforceable.6 Although the standard
determining what constitutes unreasonably large liquidated damage can at
times be identical to the “shock the conscience” standard of
unconscionability,7 it is generally less strict. Or, in another area, covenants
not to compete with a business or an employer may be found intolerable if
the duration or the geographic scope of the non-compete obligation is too
2

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79 Comment c., § 208 Comment d.
See WHITE AND SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.5 at 223 (4th Ed. 1995)
(“reported litigation based on excessive price has dwindled to a trickle.”)
4
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3), cmt f; C&J Fertilizer v. Allied Mutual,
227 N.W.2d 169 (Ia. 1975).
5
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 Buffalo L. Rev. 185 (2004); Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.2000); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d
246 (N.Y. 1998).
6
UCC §2-718(1) (“A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a
penalty.”)
7
See, e.g., Leeber v. Deltona Corp., 546 A.2d 452 (Maine 1988).
3
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long or too broad. Finally, in some areas of contracting there are statutory
caps that determine the maximal allowable stretch of the bargain. Usury
laws and price gouging acts are typical examples of a maximum
constraint; lemon laws and minimum wage laws are examples of
minimum constraints. If the contract contains bargained-for terms that are
outside these regulatory limits, the terms can be struck.
Much ink has been spilled on the question what is and ought to be the
limit to private contracting—what constitute excessive terms. It is not my
intent to contribute to this inquiry. Rather, assuming that a court applies
any given constraint on private contracting and invalidates terms that
violate these constraints, an additional inquiry is needed. Once the
excessive term is invalidated, there is a gap in the contract that calls for
gap-filling. How should this gap be filled?
It should be noted, though, that courts have not always been ready to fill
such gaps (that arise from invalidated illegal terms) and historically
elected not to do so. Instead, when a contract contained an unconscionable
element, the entire contract was rendered unenforceable.8 It was not
considered the role of the courts to write the contract over, in a more
reasonable fashion. Even today, when the unconscionability of some terms
is linked to flawed assent, as in the case of duress or fraud, courts may
refuse to reform the term and instead vacate the entire agreement.9 Beyond
such non-enforcement consequences, overreaching can give rise to civil
and criminal penalties such as disgorgement, fines and damage
multipliers.10
Modern courts have less trouble reforming the contract and enforcing it.
Unconscionability statutes provide clear authority to do so. For example,
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows courts to “limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.”11 Even more explicit, under the Principles of
European Contract Law, a court may “adapt the contract in order to bring
8

See Earl of Chesterfild v. Janssen, 28 Eng.Rep. 82 (Ch.1750).
See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrines, 60 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1993) (comparing the two approaches).
10
See Federal Price Gouging Prevention Act, H.R. 1252, 110th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2007); Fair
labor Standard Act, 29 U.S.C.A §16(b).
11
UCC § 2-302(1). See also Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.108(3).
9
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it into accordance with what might have been agreed had the requirements
of good faith and fair dealing been followed.”12 There remains some
debate whether courts can affirmatively replace the offending term with a
different one not drafted by the parties, or whether they are restricted to
crossing out existing terms and letting the legal gap-fillers set in. Section
III of the paper reviews some of this debate. It demonstrates that many
courts believe that they have sufficient authority to reduce an excessive
term to any level they deem appropriate.
When the court decides to enforce the contract and reform the excessive
term, it has to apply some principled policy in choosing the new term.
True, this is not the “pure” gap-filling scenario of a contract that contains a
lacuna and needs supplementation. Rather, this is an artificial gap that
arises out of a legal policy that eliminates an existing express term.
Nevertheless, this is a situation in which technically there is no longer an
express provision in an otherwise enforceable contract and a new
provision needs to be supplied. In the same way that courts need to turn to
a gap-filling methodology when they knock out non-matching express
terms in a battle of the forms,13 courts need to follow a systematic gapfilling pattern when repairing unconscionable terms.
B. Three Solutions
When the excessive term is struck down and a gap is created in the
contract, how should this gap be filled? Courts generally follow one of
three possible approaches.
1. The Most Reasonable Term. The standard criterion for filling gaps in
contracts is to supply the most reasonable, majoritarian term. While this
criterion is more often identified with gap-filling in indefinite contract or
as a solution to the battle of the forms, it is also a sensible solution to the
gap arising from the invalidated excessive term. Thus, if the price is
unconscionable, replace it with a reasonable, intermediate level market
12

Principles of European Contract Law, Article 4.109 (2002).
It is common to apply gap-fillers in situations in which the gap arises, not from
indefiniteness in drafting, but from the knock-out of an express term. Compare UCC §2204(3) (gap-fillers apply to “open terms”) and UCC §2-207(3) (gap-fillers apply as a
result of the knock out of express terms.)

13

-7-

HOW TO REPAIR UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS

price.14 If a liquidated damages remedy is excessive and punitive, replace
it with standard expectation damages, measured by the contract-cover
differential or by lost profits, excluding any uncommonly high
consequential damages.
Often, this solution of supplying the most reasonable mid-range term
arises implicitly. A court might strike the offensive term and make no
affirmative substitution. The default rule would then apply, effectively
supplying a reasonable provision. For example, if an unconscionable
arbitration term is struck, the court need not select an affirmative gapfiller; in the absence of an arbitration provision, parties resolve their
dispute in court. Or, if an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy is
unconscionable, it falls and the insurer’s obligation is read without it.
Here, even if the court does not pay explicit attention to the principle
underlying the gap filling process, it often chooses an outcome that is
consistent with a most-reasonable-term approach.
There is much to be said, of course, in support of this regime. The mostreasonable-terms are, by definition, the most compelling ex-post solution.
Contractors are allowed to deviate from them, within limits, and a court
would normally let such deviations stand. But if the court deemed the
situation fit for intervention, why not take the opportunity and write the
most balanced contractual term for the parties?
2. The Most Unfavorable Term. If the drafting party overreached by trying
to secure an excessive gain, the court can “punish” this behavior by
depriving this party of the entire advantage. The contract is enforced, but
the excessive term is supplemented by a term least favorable (within
reason) to the drafting party. Thus, for example, if a creditor bargained for
excessive, usurious interest rate, a court can replace it with 0% interest. If
the duration of a non-compete clause is excessive, the court can strike
altogether, effectively replacing it with zero duration. In fact, in some
scenarios the example mentioned above of a vacated arbitration term can
be regarded as an illustration of the most-unfavorable-term approach. The
most reasonable gap-filler, it can be argued, is a fair and balanced
arbitration arrangement that would replace the one-sided arbitration term
14

See, e.g., Aristides N. Hatzis and Eleni Zervogianni, Judge-Made Contracts:
Restructuring Unconscionable Contracts (Mimeo., 2007).
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that was struck. Eliminating arbitration altogether and sending the dispute
to court is a way to punish the overreaching party and tilting the result in
favor of the other party.
This gap filling approach is punitive in the same way as the doctrine of
contra proferentum. It is not intended to identify the most balanced
outcome, ex post. Instead, it is intended to induce the drafter to make
drafting choices that would not overreach and would not necessitate court
intervention in the first place. It is a species of a penalty default rule, and
as such it is consistent with the same policy concerns that supposedly
justify penalty rules: forcing a party who enjoys a bargaining advantage
(here, superior bargaining power) to forgo some of the gains that he can
extract.
3. The Maximally Tolerable Term. Finally, if a term is considered
excessive, it can be broken down to two distinct components: the
maximally tolerable portion, and everything beyond it. Once the second
component—the excessive increment is eliminated, the remainder is no
longer unconscionable (even if still relatively one-sided), and does not
necessitate further intervention. This remainder—the maximally allowable
term—would be enforceable.
To compare the three solutions, consider a situation in which the
reasonable price of a service is $500. If purchased under conditions of a
thick market, the price would always be $500. But situations arise in
which one of the parties may experience urgency or vulnerability, or,
alternatively, enjoy bargaining leverage, such that the price for the same
service may reflect those circumstances. Assume that it is not
unreasonable to charge as much $750 to a buyer-in-need, or to pay as little
as $250 to a desperate seller. Thus, any price within the range of $250 and
$750 would be enforceable. But what if the service provider exploits her
bargaining power to charge an unreasonable price of $1000, and this price
gets struck by court? Under the most reasonable term approach, the gapfiller would be $500—this is the term that most comports with the
community standards of fairness.15 Under the unfavorable term approach,
the gap filler would be $250 (or perhaps even lower, if the stated purpose
is not merely to repair the contract, but to punish the offender.) And under
15

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 Comment d.
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the maximally tolerable term approach, the gap-filler would be $750—the
maximal price within the tolerable range.
II. MAXIMALLY TOLERABLE TERMS: A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION
Two of the three solutions discussed above are familiar to most readers.
Both the most-reasonable-term and the unfavorable-term approaches have
an intuitive appeal and are based on premises that are shared by more
prominent theories of gap-filling and contract interpretation. They can be
viewed as analogous to the two familiar criteria for default rules –
majoritarian and penalty defaults. I have nothing more to say about these
approaches and I will therefore focus in the remainder of this paper on the
third regime—the maximally-tolerable-terms. This regime is based on a
principle that many might find, upon first reflection, objectionable. It
allows a party who acted poorly (by overreaching) to escape with
minimum sanction. This leniency might seem both unjust and a weak
deterrent. Since my goal here is to dispel some of this intuitive rejection of
the maximally tolerable principle, I begin in this section with analysis of
its conceptual grounding. I hope to show that that the maximally tolerable
principle is consistent with some fundamental premises regarding contract
enforcement. This will help understand, later, why this rule is quite
prominent in practice.
A. Maximum Terms and the Freedom to Bargain
Parties are entitled to engage in tough negotiations, maneuver for
advantages, and insist on self-serving contractual terms. Drafting a
contract that contains terms other than the most reasonable ones is not
illegal nor is it uncommon. It is only when these advantages are
excessive—when they reach beyond a level that is regarded as tolerable—
that the law steps in to invalidate them. Thus, if a court is to reform the
excessive contract, it is only the illegitimate element of the one-sided term
that needs to be struck. Effectively, then, the court would fill the gap with
a term that is still one-sided, still favorable to the same party who dictated
the original excessive term, but moderated sufficiently so that it would be
tolerable—so as to fit it within the range that is considered legitimate.
This solution preserves to the maximum the bargaining advantage secured
in the contract. It is therefore the one most consistent with the idea that
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bargaining power ought to be respected, not undone. In a companion
paper, I examine the merits of a new criterion for filling gaps in purely
distributive terms (such as price). Under that criterion, gaps should be
filled in a way that reflects the relative bargaining power of the parties.16
Specifically, the court-supplied term ought to resemble as much as
possible the term that the parties would have negotiated expressly, even if
such a term clearly favors the stronger party. This idea is based on
normative grounding: if there is a range in which parties are allowed to
bargain, the best that default rules can do is mimic the point within this
range that the parties would hypothetically choose.
The maximally tolerable term that is discussed here is consistent with this
more general bargain-mimicking idea because it reflects the relative
bargaining power of the parties. To be sure, it is not a pure bargainmimicking term. The perfect mimicking term was in fact written in the
contract, and yet it was found unenforceable under a policy aimed at
limiting the reach of bargaining power. Obviously, the court should not
reinstate the same term it has just struck down. What the court would
mimic here is the hypothetical bargain that parties negotiating over a
truncated domain would reach. This is the term that the parties would
choose (or, that the strong party would dictate), had they anticipated that
courts would enjoin them from enforcing the invalid one. This solution
accords with a “general duty of the court to preserve so much of a contract
as may properly survive its invalid and ineffective provisions”17—namely,
to enforce the entire contract minus the excessive increment.
B. Grounds for Intervention
Under doctrines like unconscionability which are intended to provide
relief from extreme terms, there is no clear authority or justification for
courts to provide more than the minimum necessary relief. The court’s
authority to intervene in the contract and to police its terms arises from the
fact that an express term lies beyond society’s tolerable range. The further
out this term relative to what is tolerable, the greater the justification for
intervention. Once the offensive term has been pushed into the tolerable
16

Omri Ben-Shahar, “A Bargaining Power Theory of Gap Filling”, Mimeo. (University
of Michigan Law School, 2007).
17
Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Services Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032 (Ala. 2003).
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range, even if only barely so, there is no remaining justification for
intervention.
One way to reinforce this idea is by considering the following synthetic
illustration. Imagine again the case in which the contract contains an
excessive price, $1000, and suppose that the process of adjusting the price
involves a gradual examination of successively lower prices. That is, after
deciding that $1000 is too high, the court considers one price lower, say
$990. If that price is also unconscionable, the court considers a further
incremental reduction, to $980. It continues similarly step-by-incrementalstep until it reaches a price which is no longer considered intolerable.
Once that price is reached, the process of adjusting the price downwards
would then stop. There will be no remaining justification—at least not
under direct policy grounds that give rise to the unconscionability
redress—for further adjustments of the price beyond this threshold.
Put differently, if we analogize the process of judicial intervention in the
contract to a force that pulls the price from its current intolerable level
towards the permissible region, the force gradually weakens as the price
gets closer to the tolerable level, and vanishes completely as soon as this
level is hit. The point where this adjustment process runs out of
justification is not the mid-range, majoritarian, most-balanced term.
Rather, it is the maximally tolerable price: it is still a one-sided term,
albeit not as bad as the original term.
Conceptually, this argument is consistent with the language that authorizes
court intervention in unconscionable contract. If, as the UCC instructs,
courts are authorized “to limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result,”18 this authority to further
tinker with any clause expires once the term is no longer unconscionable.
This argument goes some distance towards justifying the maximal
tolerable terms. It is based on the logic that if legal intervention in the
contract is justified by a particular distributive concern, it is also limited
by this very concern. There are several equivalent ways to articulate this
claim. One is to compare a contract that contains the maximally tolerable
price term with a contract that is all else equal, but contains an even worse
18

UCC § 2-302
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price term. If there is no good reason to intervene in the former, is there a
reason to intervene in the latter beyond fixing it to look like the former?
We shall see later, there may be incentive-based reasons for a more
aggressive intervention in the latter contract. But those are different than
the distributive concerns justifying the intervention in the first place.
Another equivalent way of saying this is to focus on the complaint of the
weak party. This party has no reasonable grounds to demand more than
the minimal redress tailored by the maximally tolerable term. Once
accorded this adjustment, what basis does he have for demanding
additional relief?19
C. Cross-Doctrinal Foundations
This conceptual defense of the idea of minimum-necessary-relief accords
with other deep-rooted practices of the law in general, and contract law in
particular, which entitle a party to concede a greater contested claim in
order to secure a smaller uncontested claim. For example, the doctrine of
remittitur deals with excessive jury verdicts in civil trials. The judge
determines the portion of the verdict that is excessive and gives the
plaintiff the option to remit—to concede—this increment, or face a new
trial. The verdict is not entirely voided, nor is it replaced with the most
reasonable amount. Rather, only the excrescence—the sum which exceeds
“the highest amount which the jury properly could have awarded”—is
lopped off.20 Many courts have specifically rejected the more intrusive
approach, which reduces the excessive judgment to the level that is most
fair. Instead, they prefer the minimal intervention approach, reducing the
judgment “to the maximum that would be upheld by the trial court as not
excessive.”21
There is more than geometric resemblance between remittitur and the
maximally tolerable terms principle. Both are based on a premise that an
“outcome” can lie within a range, and as long as it is within the range
19

This rationale is recognized by Corbin: “The line [representing the enforceable term]
must be drawn somewhere, and it is drawn at the point where the protection to which the
buyer is justly entitled ends.” See Arthur L. Corbin, On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit: A
Comment, 23 Conn.B.J. 40, 46 (1949).
20
Dick v. Watonwan Co., 562 F. Supp. 1083, 1108 (1983); See, generally, 11 WRIGHT,
MILLER, AND KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 167 (2d ed. 1995).
21
Earl v. Bouchard Transportation Co., Inc., 917 F.2d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir., 1990)
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there is no ground for intervention. In the remittitur, context, the outcome
is the jury’s judgment regarding damages. It does not have to be a
balanced mid-range compromise between the litigants opposing positions.
It can lean towards one party, but not in an unreasonable, intolerable
fashion. If it goes outside this region, it is pushed back to the maximally
tolerable level.
Another procedural practice that applies a maximum-tolerable criterion
can be found in choice of law and enforcement of foreign judgments. If a
foreign court that had jurisdiction over a civil matter issued a judgment
that is unreasonable and violates the forum state’s public policy, one
solution can be straight dismissal. But a typical solution is to enforce the
judgment to the maximally acceptable level. As the German high court
explained, the fact that the foreign judgment exceeds the damages that
German courts would normally award is not a bar to its recognition. What
matters is whether the judgment conflicts so strongly with fundamental
German concepts as to “make it seem intolerable.”22 In that case, the court
struck the punitive damage element of a U.S tort judgment but enforced a
high compensatory judgment that included elements not normally awarded
in Germany.
The principle underlying maximally tolerable terms is also strikingly
similar to the idea of “fallback” provisions and severability in
constitutional law.23 When a court invalidates a law, it has to replace it
with a substitute provision, and does so by either severing only the invalid
part, or replacing it with a fallback arrangement that was included in the
original enactment. In either case, the court is not searching for the most
reasonable substitute, nor is it punishing the legislator for overreaching. It
seeks to limit the intervention to the minimum necessary extent.
Within contract law too, one can find the roots of the idea that excessive
provisions can be cured by incremental, rather than total, invalidation. A
party may concede a gap in the contract in favor of the other party in order

22

32 Int’l Leg. Materials 1327 (1993), reported in Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes
(Zivilsachen) BGHZ 118, 312 (1993) (Case Reference: IX ZR 149/91 Civil Division).

23

Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 Colum. L.Rev. 303 (2007).
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to cure indefiniteness and enforce the conceded contract.24 Indeed, as we
shall see in the next section, it is quite common for parties who lose their
case in defense of an unconscionable term to concede the offensive
element and ask the court to enforce the remainder. Many courts are
receptive to such requests.25
More generally, the idea of minimum necessary relief can be embedded in
the doctrine of waiver. The drafting party is treated as accepting a
reduction of the self-serving term, waiving her right to insist on full
unlimited enforcement of that term. With the waiver in place, there is no
remaining ground for intervention. As the Supreme Court of Texas
recognized in this context:
“Even thought the contract may be illegal and unenforceable
as written, one of the parties may make it legal and
enforceable by offering to take out of it the offending
provision that makes it illegal…26
D. Identifying the Maximal Threshold
While the criterion underlying the maximally tolerable terms—the upper
bound of the legitimate range of contracting—may be conceptually
coherent in the abstract, is it implementable by courts? Is it possible to
adjudicate this criterion and identify the threshold? There are aspects to
this inquiry regarding the practicality of the criterion that implicate the
normative discussion, and will be postponed till later. For it might be
possible to identify the maximally tolerable threshold but only at an
increased adjudication cost, in which case the normative argument in favor
of this criterion would weaken.
I believe that there are many scenarios in which it is possible to identify a
maximally tolerable level. Section III below demonstrates how courts
manage fairly easily to follow this criterion. In some situations the
threshold is easy to identify because it is expressly established by
regulations. For example, in some States the maximal scope of non24

1 Farnsworth on Contracts §3.29 (3rdEd. 1999); Ben-Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree:
Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wisc. L.Rev. 389, 421.
25
See, infra, text accompanying notes 52 to 57.
26
Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchinson and Overton Clinic, 269 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1954).
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compete clauses in employment contracts is set by statute. Likewise, the
maximal interest rate to be charged for credit or for late payment is
regulated in every jurisdiction. Contracts that exceed these thresholds can
easily be reformed to the maximal statutorily permissible levels. We will
see, however, that in situations in which the threshold is crystal clear,
there is also a stronger suspicion that the overreaching occurred in bad
faith. In these cases, there is a stronger argument that the exceeding party
ought to be punished and deprived of more than just the excess.
In other situations, where the maximum threshold is not set forth in a
statute, courts can follow the principle of maximally tolerable terms
without pinpointing the precise threshold. The premise underlying
doctrines like unconscionability is that courts can distinguish, ad hoc
between what is and is not tolerable. Specifically, courts can look at high
end of what other merchants do in the market,27 or at a majoritarian term
boosted by a reasonable premium. As long as they do not err above the
maximum, they can cautiously set a term that, while still favorable to the
drafting party, is nevertheless not unreasonable. In the example above, the
court does not need to decide whether $750 is the uppermost tolerable
level that can replace the struck-down price of $1000. The defendant
might point to another, say, $650, as tolerable (perhaps the defendant
already collected $650 and is willing to stop there; or proves that other
merchants charge this price.) As long as the defendant’s proposed term is
within the tolerable range, it is consistent with the maximally tolerable
criterion.
In some situations, a party drafting a mass-market contract may
“experiment” with a one-sided term (e.g., arbitration term, or exclusionary
clause) that is eventually held by courts to be overreaching. In time, the
drafting party will modify the boilerplate contract and offer a less extreme
version of the one-sided term to new customers. But what about the old
customers that accepted the original, excessive term? In these settings, the
existence of a new, modified version that survives the scrutiny of courts
27

One court held that medical charges below the 75th percentile of what other providers
charge are “within the range of the overall market.” See Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., inc.,
461 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1270 (S.D.Fla. 2006). See generally, Mark A. Hall and Carl E.
Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace,
106 Mich. L.Rev. 634, 686-689 (2008).
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makes a good candidate for the maximally tolerable term. This modified
term would likely still be one-sided relative to the most reasonable or
balanced term, but it would be tolerable.
Moreover, there is ample evidence that the parties themselves believe that
the principle of maximally tolerable terms is implementable. As I will
mention in the next Section, many contracts include severability or
savings clauses that instruct courts to enforce any provision that is found
to be excessive to the maximal extent permitted by law. If an interest rate
is excessive, the maximal permissible rate should apply; if a warranty
disclaimer is too harsh, the maximal permissible disclaimer applies; and so
on. The parties themselves, it appears, believe in this criterion.
In the end, it might still be difficult in some situations to identify a discrete
threshold for the maximally tolerable term. For one, it is possible that the
choices cannot be ordered along some linear or other simple yardstick. All
the examples used above involve price or other quantitative single
dimensional terms, whereby the preference ordering over the set of
possible terms is simple: the closer to the original term, the better for the
drafting party. But in other contexts this may not be the case. If, say, the
contract stipulates mandatory arbitration and designates a biased
arbitrator, what is the next best term? Who is the “maximally tolerable
arbitrator”? Or, if the unconscionable term is a compound or multidimensional term, there are many ways to reform it and make it maximally
tolerable. In these situations, and perhaps generally it might be easier to
resort to market data and apply the most reasonable, majoritarian terms.
But the thesis of this paper does not fail even under this shortcoming. The
thesis is proposed in a more tentative fashion: maximal tolerable terms
ought to be considered as a way to repair unconscionable contract to the
extent that the court has information about the maximal tolerable
threshold. Such information, in other words, ought not to be ignored.
III. DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS
This section examines some existing practices that are consistent with the
maximally tolerable terms approach. It also identifies some instances in
which this criterion was expressly rejected. Overall, I hope to show that in
many subtle ways contract law applies an approach that is close to
maximally tolerable terms regime.
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A. Severability Clauses
Before turning to legal rules that determine how to repair excessive terms,
it is important to note that such principles can be enacted in the contracts
themselves. Maximally tolerable gap-fillers can emerge in practice as a
result of contractual drafting that instructs courts to apply such a criterion.
Specifically, a party who drafts a self-serving standard form contract often
adds a boilerplate severability clause, stating:
If any provision in the contract is not permitted by governing
law, such provision shall not be construed to be null and of
no effect, but court shall construe the agreement to provide
for the maximum enforceable application.28
Many contracts contain similar language, rendering a term enforceable “to
the maximal extent permitted by law.” For example, a lending term may
stipulate that the creditor is entitled to the “maximum rate” and that if the
charged interest exceeds the maximal permissible rate, the creditor should
refund only the amount of such excess.29 Or, a warranty/liability term can
disclaim all warranties or damages to the maximum extent permitted by
law.30 These are situations in which the parties anticipate the possibility
that a one-sided term might be struck, and instruct the courts specifically
28

Laurence H. Pretty, PATENT LITIGATION, at 15-41.
See, e.g., J Robert Brown and Herbert B. Max, Raising Capital: Private Placement
Forms & Techniques (“payee shall never be deemed to have contracted for, or be entitled
to receive as interest on this note, interest ….or any amount in excess of the Maximum
rate. […] if the interest received … exceeds the maximum rate, then payee shall refund
the amount of such excess.”) See also Richard T Williamson, Selling Real Estate Without
Paying Taxes: A Guide to Capital Gains Tax Alternatives 173 (“no payment or interest
shall exceed the maximum amount permitted by law. Any payment in excess of the
maximum amount shall be [disbursed to the payor].”
30
See, e.g., Napster’s Terms and Conditions, available at www.napster.com/terms.html
(“To the Extent that in a particular circumstance any disclaim or limitation on damages or
liability set forth herein is prohibited by applicable law, then instead of the provision
hereof […] Napster shall be entitled to the maximum disclaimers and/or limitations on
damage and liability available at law or in equity…”). See also RealNetworks EULA
(“To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, RealNetworks further disclaims all
warranties”); Open Source License, in Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding Open
Source and Free Software Licensing; Altova term: (“Because some states do not allow
the exclusion or limitation of liability, the above limitation may not apply to you. In such
states, liability shall be limited to the maximal extent permitted by law.”) (emphasis
added)
29
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how to fill gaps in the agreement. The instruction is for the court to follow
a one-sided methodology, picking terms that are equivalent to the maximal
tolerable provisions.
Of course, courts can disregard such severability clauses, perhaps on the
basis that such terms oust the inherent jurisdiction of the court to choose a
remedy for wrongful behavior. Or, courts might consider the effect of such
clauses to be undesirable and contrary to public policy. One way in which
such clauses are undesirable is their vagueness. They refer to a fallback
that equals the maximal-extent-permitted-by-law, but they do not define
this substitute clearly, and render it difficult for contracting parties to
determine the provision that will ultimately govern.
To illustrate this vagueness problem of the severability clause, imagine a
hypothetical arbitration term that reads:
Any dispute arising out of this agreement will be arbitrated
under the arbitration rules of the AAA and take place in the
state that is least convenient for the plaintiff, so long as this
is not too inconvenient to constitute an unconscionable
burden.
Can this clause, with its built-in unconscionability constraint, still be
struck as unconscionable? Upon first blush, it would be difficult to view
this clause as unconscionable because by its very language it refers to
place that is not unconscionable. To resolve the paradox, it can be argued
the flaw in such a clause is its vagueness: it does not give potential
disputants sufficient notice where they may be required to arbitrate.31
B. The Doctrine of Partial Enforcement
The doctrine of partial performance is a method that enables courts to
enforce a term that is otherwise unreasonable or extreme in a partial,
tolerable manner. The archaic “Blue Pencil Rule” was the origin of this
method. Under this rule, when a contract contained an invalid term, the
invalid portion would be literally crossed out (by the metaphoric blue
pencil). If the language that remained was grammatically meaningful, it
would be enforced. Otherwise, if the remainder was not coherent without
31

For a similar problem in constitutional law, see Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107
Colum. L. Rev. 303, 311 (2007).
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some affirmative rewriting, it was entirely invalid.32 Here, if the contract
was selectively enforced, the remainder did not follow a principled
criterion – maximally tolerable or any other criterion. The outcome had an
arbitrary, inconsistent, aspect.
Yet there was an appealing feature to the Blue Pencil rule that the more
modern approach to partial enforcement sought to preserve. It was a
technique that allowed courts to depart from the older and even more rigid
all-or-nothing regime, which simply voided any unreasonable provision in
its entirety. If the provision were divisible, why not sever only the
offensive part—the minimally necessary part—and enforce the remainder?
While such divisibility was the policy underlying the Blue Pencil rule, the
mechanical procedure of the rule significantly limited its effectiveness. A
better rule for partial enforcement could implement the divisibility policy
without constraining courts by a grammatical criterion.
Under the modern partial enforcement doctrine, a court is authorized to
reform an unreasonable term in a contract and enforce it to extent
necessary to avoid the unreasonableness. The court does not have to use
the blue pencil method. It can do more than just cross out some language
and enforce the remainder. It can, in addition, substitute the offensive
language with a different provision. The underlying goal is to give
maximal effect to the parties’ agreement, subject to the constraint of
avoiding unreasonableness.33 This goal it is often implemented by
amending the excessive term with the maximal tolerable term.
Perhaps the most striking (and most common) application of this partial
performance technique involves covenants not to compete. When an
employee enters an employment contract, he often signs a non-compete
clause with the employer, applicable in the event that the employment
ends. Similarly, when a business is sold with its good will, the seller often
promises to not compete with the buyer. These restraints are at times too
harsh, either by setting too long a duration of the non-compete period, or
by defining the geographical boundaries of the non-compete region too
broadly. Old decisions in the all-or-nothing tradition used to void these as
unreasonable restraints altogether, and leave the parties free of any
32
33

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.8 (4th Ed. 2004)
Williston and Corbin, On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit, 23 Conn.B.J. 40, 49-50 (1949).

- 20 -

HOW TO REPAIR UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS

restraint.34 Even today, in some European legal traditions such excessive
restraints are considered void and may not be adjusted by courts.35 Blue
Pencil decisions—somewhat less strict—granted relief by partially
enforcing the restraints if they were grammatically meaningful without the
offensive words. But most courts nowadays substitute an offensive term
with a maximally tolerable one.36
At times, the maximal tolerable level is defined explicitly be statutes.
Some states have enacted bright line rules stating the maximal duration of
non-compete clauses in employment contracts. In these states, when the
contract contains a non-compete term that is longer than the statutory cap,
it is normally truncated to be equal to that cap.37 That is, only the
increment of the restraint that is socially intolerable is eliminated; the rest
stands. In other states there is no bright line statute. There, too, courts
reduce the non-compete term, bringing it down to a level that is tolerable.
The restraint “is not enforceable beyond the time or area considered
reasonable by the court.”38 The permissible duration varies across
circumstances and jurisdictions. Case law provides numerous examples
for the cap being set between 6 months to 10 years.39
34

The earliest case is Mitchell v. Reynolds (1711) 1 P Wms 181, 24 Eng Reprint 347.
This rule remained in force in England and in the U.S till the end of the 19th century. See
C.T. Drechsler, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Employment
Contract, as Affected by Territorial Extent of Restriction, 43 A.L.R2d 94, §6(a).
35
See Aristides N. Hatzis and Eleni Zervogianni, Judge Made Contracts – Restructuring
Unconscionable Contracts, p. 6 (Mimeo., 2007) (citing German Law).
36
See, e.g., Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L.Rev.
625, 646-651 (1960); Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53 (N.J. 1970.).
37
See, e.g., §542.335(1)(d)1, Fl. Stat. (1997) (“a court… shall presume unreasonable in
time any restraint more than 2 years in duration”), enforced in Flickenger v. Fitzgerald &
Co., 732 So.2d 33 (Fl. 1999); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §23.921C (2006); S.D. Codified Laws
§53-9-11 (2007).
38
See, e.g., Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. 1974). In other countries
the unlawfulness of the restraint is a matter for the courts to determine, but again with the
consequence that if found unlawful, the restraint is not struck down in toto, but reduced
to its maximally tolerable level. For a French decision, see Cass. Soc., 21 October 1960,
JCP 1960.II.11886, discussed in BEALE ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON
CONTRACT LAW 312-313 (2002)
39
See, e.g., Kramer v. Robec, Inc., 824 F.Supp. 508, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (Pennsylvania
court reducing a 3 year restraint to 2 years; enforcing a geographical limit of the entire
U.S.); Fullerton Lumber v. Torborg, 70 N.W.2d 585 (Wisc. 1955) (Wisconsin court
reducing a 10 year restraint to 3 years); American Weekly v. Patterson, 16 A.2d 912 (Md.
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This approach can, and in fact applies to other contexts in which excessive
terms place unreasonable restraint on a party. Thus, for example, in a
German case dealing with an exclusive supply arrangement, in which the
buyer was obligated to purchase its entire requirements over 24 years from
the seller, the court reduced the exclusivity term to the maximal tolerable
duration of 16 years.40
The stated aim of this jurisprudence is to protect one party’s interest, as
displayed in the contract, without unreasonable hardship upon the other
party. While this is a cost-benefit test, it would be wrong to conclude that
the courts are enforcing the most efficient or most reasonable gap-filler.41
Rather, courts view their role as securing the bargain that the parties
struck, recognizing the superior bargaining power of one of the parties.
The cost-benefit test is used to identify, not the surplus maximizing term,
but only what is excessive. A limitation that burdens an employee without
according benefit to the employer is deemed unreasonable. Thus, in
eliminating the unreasonable portion of the restraint, the court is setting
not the most reasonable or common term, nor a majoritarian or average
provision, but rather the maximally tolerable one.
It is important to recognize that the application of maximally tolerable
terms in this context is limited by a safety valve which will be discussed in
more detail in the normative analysis below. The concern is that the
doctrine of partial enforcement and the application of maximally tolerable
terms might give drafters incentives to dictate overly oppressive restraints,
expecting to lose at worst only the excessive increment but to keep it
anytime it is not challenged. In light of this concern, courts are ready to
invalidate the entire non-compete clause (namely, replace the duration
term with zero) if there is evidence of deliberate overreaching.42
1940) (Maryland court reducing a 5 year restraint to 4 years); Foltz v. Struxness, 215
P.2d 133 (Kan. 1950) (Kansas court enforcing a 10 year restraint)
40
BGH 16 and 17 September 1974, NJW 1974.2089. See also Beale et. al., supra note
38, at 313-314.
41
In many contexts, the most common duration gap-filler is at-will termination—a zero
restraint on the right of an employee to walk away. See, e.g. UCC 2-309(2) (at-will
termination in sales contracts); Payne. V. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519
(1884) (termination of employment contract).
42
See, e.g., Central Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn.1984).
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Maximally tolerable terms apply only if the crossing of the boundary was
done without bad faith. It might be difficult at times to ascertain whether
there was bad faith. A presumption of bad faith may exist when the noncompete restraint is unlimited in duration, and often courts indeed vacate
such restraint completely.43
C. Unconscionability
1. Price and Interest Rates
When a term in the contract is struck under the doctrine of
unconscionability, courts have broad discretion how to repair the contract.
A common solution would be to strike the offensive term and replace it
with nothing, enforcing the remainder of the contract. This, of course, is
an implicit choice to replace the excessive term with the default rule—the
gap-filler that applies in the absence of an express term. Thus, when the
cross-collateral term was struck in Williams v. Walker-Thomas,44 it was
replaced with the default rule that granted the seller no special security in
the buyer’s prior purchases.
This solution—replacing the offensive term with the legally supplied
default provision—would rarely end up with the maximally tolerable term.
The legally supplied gap fillers are normally the majoritarian, mostreasonable provisions and do not favor the drafting party. Still, there are
many circumstances in which the court chooses to affirmatively redraft the
term, and to set it at the maximally tolerable terms. This is achieved by
striking not the entire offensive term, but only the increment of it that is
found unconscionable. The remaining component could still be one-sided,
but no longer unconscionable. Corbin seems to have recognized this
criterion when he explained, in the context of a loan of money, that “a
contract that requires a payment of a very high interest will be enforced,
up to the point at which ‘unconscionability’ becomes an operative
factor.”45

43

E.g., Harvest Ins. Agency v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co. 492 N.E.2d 686, 690 (Ind. 1986).
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 f.2d 445 (D.C. Cut. 1965).
45
1 Corbin, Contracts § 129, p. 556 (1963) (emphasis added).
44
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In some cases, courts have effectively replaced an unconscionable term
with something that resembles the maximal tolerable term. Courts are
willing to do this when protecting uninsured patients against excessive
medical and hospital bills. In one case, an unconscionable charge was
substituted by reference to what other medical providers charge, choosing
a point in the high end of the distribution of prices.46 Anecdotally, this was
also the result in the classic door-to-door sale case, Toker v. Westerman,47
in which the buyer agreed to pay over $1200 for a refrigerator that
normally sells for $400. After the buyer paid more than $650, he sought
relief from the oppressive price. The court indeed struck down the price as
unconscionable, but allowed the seller to keep the money already paid.
True, the court did not directly hold the seller is entitled to the maximal
tolerable price. The $650 figure happened to be the amount already paid
when the case was initiated. The buyer only asked for the remainder to be
unenforceable; he did not seek restitution of some of the money previously
paid. But in another case, in which the price was not yet paid, the court
specifically reversed a lower court’s stipulation of a low net-cost price,
and allowed the seller to collect a price that included all indirect costs plus
a reasonable profit. For a product that has a thick market, this comes close
to a maximal price.48
Another implicit application of this approach comes from the decision of
the district court in the famous Batsakis v. Demotsis case. Recall that this
case involved a loan in Greek currency made in Greece during the war,
which, in nominal terms, amounted to the equivalent of $25. In return, the
debtor promised to pay $2000 plus interest after the war. When the time to
pay the debt came, the debtor reneged. The District Court in Texas found
that the promise to pay $2000 for a loan of $25 was not enforceable, for
lack of consideration. Sympathizing with the debtor, but recognizing also
that the contract cannot simply be voided and undone, the court ordered
the debtor to pay $750 to satisfy the debt. This result, we know, was
overturned by the Court of Appeals, which reinstated the obligation to pay
46

See Hall and Schneider, supra note 27.
274 A.2d 78 (NJ, 1970). See also Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1969) (a $300 freezer was purchased for a price that exceeds $1400; the
court allowed the buyers to stop payments after $620 were paid): Bank of Indiana Bat’l
Ass’n v. Holyfield, 476 F.Supp. 104 (Miss. 1979).
48
Frostifress v. Reynoso, 274 NYS2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev’d as to damages, 281
NYS2d 964 (App. 1967).
47
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$2000.49 For our purpose, however, it is the lower court’s decision that is
of interest, because it is only this court that found grounds for intervention
in the first place. This court effectively invalidated the $2000 price and
thus needed to fill a gap. It did not turn to the most reasonable and
balanced term, nor to a term that comports with community standards of
fairness. Rather, it used a one-sided term, just within what it perceived to
be the tolerable range.
In credit transactions, the interest rate cannot exceed statutory established
threshold or else it is considered unenforceable usury. But what happens
when it does? What is it replaced with? In one case, the court struck the
agreed upon interest rate of 200% (that was intended to apply to a short
term but ended up applying over a longer duration), and replaced it with a
24% rate. It is not clear whether this was the maximal allowable rate, but it
was significantly higher than the prevailing market rates.50 In Austrian
law, for example, a similar maximal tolerable provision is supplied: a
usurious interest rate is adjusted, brought down to equal double the basic
interest rate. In French Law, the excessive interest rate is reduced only to
the extent that they exceed the interest rate allowed by law.51 In all these
examples, a maximally tolerable criterion underlies the practice.
2. Arbitration Clauses
The same result of implementing the maximally tolerable term is obtained
when the court decides to sever the offensive component of a term and
enforce the remaining part. This practice has been widely followed in the
context of unconscionable arbitration clauses. Consider one of the recent
leading cases—Brower v. Gateway 2000.52 There, the arbitration term in a
consumer contract was unconscionable because it placed unreasonable
filing cost and location burdens on the consumer. The court vacated these
elements, but stopped short of eliminating the entire arbitration term (as
the consumer would have liked). Instead, it remanded the case to the lower
court to figure out a more reasonable arbitration forum. Specifically, it
49

Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1949)
Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 845 (1991). The prime rate around that time was
9.5% (http://www.mortgage-x.com/general/indexes/prime.asp) and the California tax
penalty interest was 10% (http://www.ftb.ca.gov/individuals/faq/ivr/617.shtml).
51
Hatzis and Zervogianni, supra note 14, at 7-8..
52
Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. 1998).
50
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acknowledged Gateway’s proposal to use a somewhat less onerous
arbitration proceeding (one that Gateway offered its new customers in the
modified version of their shrinkwrap) and instructed the trial court to
evaluate whether this proposed venue comes within the tolerable range.
Many courts apply a similar approach to repair other elements of
unconscionable arbitration clauses.53 In another case, the court severed
only the element of the arbitration clause that required the buyer to
reimburse the seller for its arbitration and attorney fees, but left everything
else in tact, including the one-sided authority of the seller over the choice
of arbitration.54 Or, in another case, when the cost of arbitration was
unaffordable to one party, the court allowed the other party to fix the
problem by making an ad-hoc concession to pay “what we need to pay to
make [arbitration] fair”—even if only so much as to make the arbitration
affordable to this particular plaintiff.55 Generally, when the arbitration
agreement is found to be patently unconscionable by cutting down
individuals’ Federal statutory rights (such as the right to seek punitive
damages), courts have reached the result that is consistent with the
maximally tolerable criterion, either by giving full force to the severability
clauses and vacating only the offensive exclusionary elements,56 or by
allowing the party who is seeking arbitration to waive the elements that
are unreasonable.57
But courts do not always resort to this principle of striking down only the
minimum necessary to bring the unconscionable term within the tolerable
region. In the leading California case, Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare, the court found some elements of an employment arbitration
clause to be unconscionable and struck down the entire clause, effectively
filling the gap with a no-arbitration term.58 The employer argued in vain
for a different result, of severing the unlawful elements in the arbitration
clause and eliminating only those elements. The court rejected this,
53

See, e.g., Swain v. Auto Services, Inc., 128 S.W. 3d 103 (Mo. 2003).
Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. 2006)
55
Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc., 346 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2003).
56
Id., at 1031-32; Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So.2d 723, 734 (Ala.,2002). But see Sosa v.
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996) for the opposite result.
57
Ex Parte Celtic Life Ins. Co., 834 So.2d 766 (Ala. 2002) (“a party to a contract can
waive a contractual provision beneficial to that party”).
58
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.2000)
54
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explaining that it has no vested power to “reform” a contractual term. In
this case, the offensive element was the asymmetry—only the employee’s
claims were directed to arbitration. The court explained that it would have
to add a new, non bargained-for term (“both sides must arbitrate their
claims”) instead of the existing, unreasonable term (“only the employee
must arbitrate its claims”). The court found this affirmative
“augmentation” to be beyond its authority, and thus chose to void the
entire arbitration clause.59 It thus rejected the application of the maximally
tolerable regime.
This is a puzzling justification. Surely, the contract is “augmented” by a
new term even under the court’s approach. Once the term is struck, the
court must supply a non bargained-for gap-filler—here a no-arbitration
clause. The Armendariz court voiced the concern that it is not for the court
to write the contract over for the parties. But surely partial enforcement of
the arbitration clause involves much less of a variation from the effects
intended by the parties than total non-enforcement.60 The question, then,
is not whether the court has the power to reform the contract—it clearly
does.61 The question is how much of the bargain needs to be eliminated:
only the minimum, rendering the remainder tolerable, or more than the
minimum, rendering the remainder fair and balanced?
It is fair to propose that what drove the court’s decision in Armendariz was
not a formalistic minimalism a-la the Blue Pencil rule. Rather, it was the
drive to reform the contract in a way that is more than the minimum
necessary, to attain a result that is more balanced and fair, rather than one
that comports with bargaining power. It was, in other words, a
masqueraded preference for the most-reasonable-term solution to the
problem of repairing unconscionable contracts, possibly justified by the
perceived deliberate bad-faith drafting on part of the employer. But
despite the precedent that this case set for defining what constitutes
unconscionability in arbitration clauses, its approach to severability was
not generally followed. Indeed, in other cases, the same California
59

Id., at 698 (“Because a court is unable to cure this unconscionability through severance
or restriction, and is not permitted to cure it through reformation and augmentation, it
must void the entire agreement”)
60
Williston and Corbin, supra note 33, at 49-50.
61
UCC 2-302, cmt 2. (“Under this section the court, in its discretion, may […] limit
unconscionable clauses so as to avoid unconscionable results.”)
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Supreme Court invoked the severability principle and vacated only the
offensive elements of the arbitration clause.62
D. Liquidated Damages
Another application of the maximal tolerable terms idea concerns
liquidated damages. It is well-known that courts do not enforce liquidated
damage terms that are clearly excessive and punitive. But what is the
damage term that courts supply instead? While the text-book answer is
“compensatory” damages, it is often the case that compensatory damages
can be assessed with more or less accuracy, thus lie within a fairly broad
range of reasonableness, from the low estimates (that rule out
consequential damages and types of avoidable harm) to high estimates
(that include generous measures of potential lost profit). A maximal
tolerable term would replace the unenforceable liquidated measure, not
with the average or most reasonable compensatory measure, but rather
with the high end estimate of expectation damages.
There are some statements in American case law that reject this notion.
When an excessive liquidated damages clause is held unenforceable, it is
wholly invalidated. In these situations, the most that courts are willing to
award is the ex-post proven expectation damages. Courts refuse to apply a
method of reducing the liquidated damages to bring them within the
reasonable range.63 Effectively, then, courts reject the maximally tolerable
regime.
But other legal traditions deal differently with penalty clauses. Under
Israeli contract law, for example, courts are instructed merely to reduce
excessive damages to the level reflecting the magnitude of loss reasonably
expected at the time of contracting.64 In one case, a liquidated damages
clause required the seller of a business to pay $700 per day of delay in
fulfilling his obligations. The seller was late by 100 days. The court found
the liquidated amount to be excessive, and held that actual damages were
62

See, e.g., Little v. Auto Stiegler, 63 P.3d 979 (Cal. 2002).
For an explicit rejection of the reduce-and-enforce methodology in penalty clauses, see
Cad Cam, Inc. v. Underwood, 521 N.E.2d 498 (Oh. 1987)
64
Contract Law (Remedies for Breach of Contract) 1970, Sec. 15(a), Sefer Ha-Chukkim
No. 609. p. 13.
63
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probably zero or close to it, because the business was running at a loss.
Still, the court decided to reduce the damages, not to the actual harm of
$0, but instead to $200 per day, explaining that “$200 per day is the
maximal amount that the parties could have anticipated as possible harm
from delay.”65 A leading commentary states that excessive liquidated
damages should be reduced “to the highest level that the court regards as
reasonably related the harm anticipated at the time of contracting…; that
is, reduced to the measure closest to the agreed sum, such that if that
measure were the one agreed upon in the first place, the court would not
have been justified in reducing it.”66 This, in other words, is the maximally
tolerable level.

IV. WHY ARE MAXIMALLY TOLERABLE TERMS USED?
The discussion so far had little to say about the normative justifications for
maximally tolerable terms. It is time to address this issue, if only because
it is now clear that this regime is not merely an intellectual curiosity, but
rather a fairly prevalent solution in a variety of contexts. In light of the
fact that the maximally tolerable term is often selected over the most
reasonable term, one wonders what makes this solution so surprisingly
prevalent. This section develops two insights. First, there is a good reason
to repair contracts in a way that maintains bargaining advantages. Second,
there is a built-in doctrinal limitation to the maximally tolerable approach,
which takes care of the problem of incentives-to-overreach.
A. Mimicking the Bargaining Advantage
When bargaining power is unevenly distributed, the strong party will
naturally seek ways to secure advantages in the contract by drafting onesided terms. As long as he does not cross the boundary of reasonableness,
contract law will respect and enforce the outcome of the bargain. Given
65

Zaken v. Ziva, Civil Appeal No. 539/92 (Unpublished), p. 4.
U. Yadin, CONTRACT LAW (REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT ) 1970, p. 132 (2d
Ed. 1979) (in Hebrew). See also Eyal Zamir et. al, BRIEF COMMENTARY ON LAW
RELATING TO PRIVATE LAW 302 (1996) (in Hebrew) (“the measure of reduction of
liquidated damages ought to be to the level for which the element of excessiveness no
longer applies…[such that] if that level was set in the first place, it would not have been
reduced by the court.”)
66
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this tolerance by the law to contracts that are (not unreasonably) onesided, and in light of the various ways that the strong party can secure
advantage, an aggressive intervention beyond the minimal necessary
might backfire.
The legal standards that determine the boundaries of permissible terms and
what constitutes unconscionability are not always obvious to the drafting
party. For example, arbitration clauses in employment contract that were
traditionally enforceable and still are in many jurisdictions are
occasionally held to be unconscionable by some courts.67 These terms set
out many characteristics of the mandatory arbitration procedure, and there
is a degree of uncertainty as to which would run afoul when challenged in
court. Even when the law is clear, parties who draft contracts are not
always informed about the legal standards. For example, if it is
permissible to write a non-compete clause in an employment contract, is a
25-mile radius marking the non-compete territory excessive?68 And even
if parties are informed, it is not always clear whether the effect of a
particular provision in the contract will be unconscionable. It depends on
the subsequent circumstances.69
If the drafting party was not fully aware of the threshold of
unconscionability and, crossing this threshold was not done deliberately
(the following section will discuss the deliberate case.) If the drafting
party is punished for overreaching by, say, replacing the excessive term
with one significantly below the maximal permissible level, she faces a
familiar dilemma. Any additional sliver of the surplus she tries to
appropriate trough an incrementally more self-favorable term has a small
upside equal to this increment if the term is enforced, but a downside of

67

Compare Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 862 (2002) (California court
holding a credit card arbitration clause unconscionable because it forbids class actions)
with Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 2003) (Illinois court
holding same clause not unconscionable).
68
See Brecher v. Brown, 17 N.W.2d 377 (Ia. 1945)
69
For example, short term credit can have a very high interest rate that reflects not only
the time-value of money, but also the “closing” fees. If the debt is to be paid off as
scheduled, the high interest rate would be tolerable. But if it is not paid off in the short
term, the interest rate can become unconscionable. See, e.g., Carboni v. Arrospide, 2
Cal.Rptr.2d 845 (1991).
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potentially significant magnitude if the term is held to be excessive and
replaced with a mid-range term.
This asymmetry between the benefit and the risk of one-sided drafting
could have two effects on the drafting party. First, it could lead her to draft
more cautiously to assure that she does not bump against the maximal
permissible boundary.70 She will maintain a safety cushion against
bumping into the ceiling by forgoing part of the surplus that she would
otherwise extract. This effect alone is not a social cost, but it may be
inefficient once we examine the effect of such extra caution on other terms
of the deal. Second, the drafting party would have added incentive to
invest in information that would enable her to assess the exact location of
the boundary. Such investment has a private value because it can help the
drafting party avoid the need for an overly cautious safety cushion, but it
has a low (or zero) social value.71
It is the first effect that requires attention. The incentive to moderate the
drafting of a term to avoid bumping against the upper permissible limit
may induce the drafting party to shift her bargaining leverage to other
terms of the contract. In extreme cases, the party with the bargaining
power might not enter the contract in the first place unless she can secure a
very favorable term (e.g., a high interest payment in the face of high risk).
In less extreme cases, she might force the other party to surrender to bad
terms that are permissible, but no less costly to that party. For example, if
the law were to apply the maximally tolerable terms, an employer who is
interested in a mandatory arbitration clause or a non-compete restraint
would experiment with drafting such terms, knowing that at worst, if a
court views the term as excessive, it would be corrected only
incrementally. But if the law replaces an excessive term with one that is
unfavorable to the employer (say, no arbitration at all; or eliminating the
non-compete restraint), the employer might be reluctant to draft such
terms in the first place, and would use her bargaining power to insist on
70

Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L., Econ. & Org.
279 (1986).
71
The argument that uncertainty over legal standards can lead parties to invest
excessively in acquitting information has been developed in the literature on the
negligence rule. See, e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages,
39 J.L. & Econ. 191 (1996); Kaplow and Shavell, Private Versus Socially Optimal
Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J. L., Econ. & Org. 306 (1992).
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lower wages, bonds, or some other costly burden on the employee. Or, in
rent-to-own cases, a seller can replace the option-to-own at a price that
reflects unconscionable finance charges with a perpetual rental scheme
that, while expensive, is less obscure and thus less likely to shock the
conscience.72 Generally, an aggressive legal intervention in one area of the
contract can shift bargain dominance to other areas, affording no true
relief to the weak party, ex ante.
Some parties might be better off by the “substitution” effect—those that
have more to lose from the inclusion of the excessive term. For example,
some employees benefit from access to court rather than arbitration, if
they are likely to go to court. Some employees benefit from elimination of
non-compete restraints, if they are likely to want to compete against their
employer. But for many other employees, these benefits are less relevant,
and the substitution effect on other terms of the contract (wage, benefits)
is more relevant. From their perspective, the aggressive legal intervention
backfires.
It is hard to weight the benefit to some against the disadvantage to others.
It is clear, though, that the redress that the law grants weak parties does
little to resolve the underlying imbalance of bargaining power. If the
problem of imbalance remains, it would continue to manifest itself
elsewhere in the contract. In fact, the strong party may now be induced
extract value in ways that take away some of the total surplus or which
require a more costly drafting and transaction procedure. The concern is
that what appears as an aggressive pro-consumer or pro-employee legal
intervention merely shift value ex-ante in favor of one group of
transactors—those that will invoke the legal intervention—and does so not
at the expense of the drafting party, but at the expense of another group of
transactors—those that will never invoke the intervention. The more
aggressive the legal intervention, the greater this cross-subsidy. If, say, a
pawnbroker must charge lower interest rates, it can instead increase the
upfront fees. Short term borrowers will then be subsidizing in part the
credit of long term borrowers.
This discussion helps explain why, in the current context, it is immaterial
whether maximally tolerable terms are in some other normative sense
72

Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn.1979).
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inferior to the “most reasonable” terms. Terms that best satisfy the
criterion or reasonableness are, by definition, more consistent with the
norms or reasonableness than terms that just barely make it. The question,
though, is not about the morally superior bargain, the fairest and most
balanced one. Rather, it is about repairing or supplementing a contract
where it is clear that one party has all the bargaining power. The argument
for maximally tolerable terms is not that these terms are ideal. They are
probably not. The reason why they may be desirable is that, very much like
standard gap fillers, they do not force upon the parties a costly
circumvention. Put differently, to fully address the underlying problem of
uneven bargaining power and impose fair bargains the law needs to do
more than the occasional tinkering with excessive terms. It is competition
policy, not gap-filling rules, which can make a difference.73
Granted, these are familiar concerns with the unconscionability doctrine—
whether it can really help weak parties or merely backfire. My argument is
that the policy choice courts face is not all-or-nothing—either provide full
protection or no protection at all. Rather, in calibrating the degree of
protection, courts deciding whether to apply the maximally tolerable
regime are exercising a choice between minimal protection, such that
raises less of the familiar “backfire” concerns, versus greater protection
with its suggested costs.
B. Incentive to Overreach
If a party with the bargaining power who is drafting an excessive term
expects that the court would only strike the excessive increment, what
incentive does she have to avoid overreaching?74 At best, the express term
will stand; at worst, it will be replaced with the most favorable term
permitted by law. Why draft a term that reflects this maximal permissible
standard if you can get away with—in fact, benefit from—drafting a more
excessive term? In contrast, if the law were to replace the excessive term
with a mid-range balanced term, or perhaps even with a contra73

An example for ‘competition policy’ in the area of excessive terms is the Federal Price
Gouging Prevention Act which punishes a whole class of retailers for raising prices
unconscionably in times of emergency. Federal Price Gouging Prevention Act, H.R.
1252, 110th Cong. §2 (2007).
74
White and Summers, supra note 3, at 234-35; Craswell, supra note 9, at 16-17.
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proferentum provision, the drafter has more to lose from overreaching and
would have an incentive to draft less extreme terms.
This is a powerful objection, recognized by many commentators and
courts.75 Ironically, it is almost too powerful to succeed under its own
terms, namely, when it is invoked to support the most-reasonable term
regime. A wrongdoer who deliberately drafts unreasonable terms can
withstand even the more aggressive reformation of the contract in those
few cases in which he is challenged, continuing his illicit business
otherwise. In the few challenged cases he will lose more than the minimal
increment, when the contract is reformed to the most reasonable term. But
if there is a pattern of unconscionable behavior, this occasional loss will
likely be dwarfed by the upside of the illicit gain. To deter such calculated
violations, something more is needed, perhaps even stronger than the
most-unfavorable term. More severe sanctions are appropriate, such as
punitive damages or anti-fraud measures.
The key to reconciling this deterrence objection with the prevalence in
practice of maximally tolerable terms is the distinction between deliberate
and inadvertent overreaching. As argued above, the line between what is
permissible and what would be considered intolerable is not clearly drawn
and not always recognized by the drafting party. At times, the line is
75

See Central Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984) where the
court notes:
“We recognize the force of the objection that judicial modification could
permit an employer to insert oppressive and unnecessary restrictions into a
contract knowing that the courts can modify and enforce the covenant on
reasonable terms. […] the employer may have nothing to lose by going to
court, thereby provoking needless litigation. If there is credible evidence to
sustain a finding that a contract is deliberately unreasonable and oppressive,
then the covenant is invalid.”
See also Jenkins v. Jenkins Irrigation, 259 S.E.2d 47, 51 (Ga. 1979); Walker v. Sheldon,
179 N.E.2d 497 (1961). The same practice is followed in Canada and England. See
Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 S.C.R 986 (“if the only sanction that
employers potentially face for failure to comply with the minimum notice periods
prescribed the Act is and order that they minimally comply with the Act, employers will
have little incentive to make contracts with their employees that comply with the Act”);
Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co. Ltd., [1913] AC 724 (the entire non-compete
clause is severed when drafted in deliberately unreasonable fashion) with Goldsoll v.
Goldman, [1915] 1 Ch. 292 (with no evidence of deliberate overreaching, only the
unreasonable increment is severed.)
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crossed knowingly and in bad faith, exploiting the high likelihood that
such overreaching will go unchallenged. Often, though, the boundaries are
not deliberately and maliciously crossed. Rather, the strong party is
choosing one way to exploit her bargaining power—and could have easily
chosen other ways that would have been deemed legitimate.
To account for this distinction between deliberate and inadvertent
overreaching, the scope of the maximally tolerable terms regime needs to
be restricted. The regime would apply only when the strong party did not
knowingly and deliberately overreach. If the boundary of permissible
terms is known and nevertheless crossed, counting on the majority of
parties to capitulate, the term should be replaced in a way that provides
deterrence—something significantly less then the maximally tolerable
term (and, I would argue, significantly less than the most reasonable terms
as well.76) A good example is the minimum wage law, which sets a clear
and bright line between tolerable and intolerable wages. An employer that
pays less than minimum wage cannot plead ignorance. Accordingly, the
statute awards the aggrieved employee more than the minimally tolerable
wages—it doubles the unpaid wages.77 But if the boundary is fuzzy and
was violated without bad faith, the law would only reduce the excessive
term back to the boundary—to the maximally tolerable level. This regime
would not lead to overly cautious drafting; and at the same time, it would
give the drafting party something to lose in cases in which the
unreasonable term was knowingly inserted. Indeed, this conditional
application of the maximally tolerable terms regime is consistent with
some of the observed practice.78
Sometimes it is clear that an unreasonable term was inserted into the
contract deliberately, in bad faith. But other times it may be difficult for
courts to determine whether the boundary was crossed deliberately, and
76

One possible solution is punitive damages; another is government enforcement. Both
solutions are used in the case of deliberate price gouging. See Federal Price Gouging
Prevention Act, H.R. 1252, 110th Cong. §3 (2007) (Enforcement by FTC with fines of up
to $3 million) and §4 (stiff criminal penalties – up to $150 million and 10 years of
imprisonment).
77
Fair labor Standard Act, 29 U.S.C.A §16(b).
78
See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 347 (4th Ed. 2004) (“absent a showing that [the
excessive clause] was drafted in good faith…, the court may fix a lesser restraint that it
would allowed the parties themselves to fix in their agreement.”)
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thus whether there was bad faith that would require a more aggressive
intervention. Can the legal rule that dictates how to repair the contract turn
on such a distinction regarding the “mens rea” of the drafting party?
Several heuristics can perhaps aid with this determination. First, as just
mentioned, it matters whether the substantive boundary of what is
maximally tolerable is set by a bright line rule or not. Bright lines are
more likely to be known (or cheaply assessed) and crossing them is easy
to prove and to redress. The whole idea of simple bright line rules, and
what distinguishes them from fuzzy standards, is that ex-post adjudication
is not needed to clarify the legal command.79 Presumably, then, a crossing
of a bright line threshold was done deliberately and deserves harsher
treatment.80 Second, it matters how egregious the excessive term is.
Terms that cross the boundary by a wide margin deserve to be reformed
more aggressively by courts for at least two reasons: they are more likely
to represent deliberate overreaching even of a fuzzy standard, and a
greater sanction is needed to offset the larger gain to the wrongdoer.
Third, it matters whether the drafter is a repeat transactor dealing in
aspects for which it is easy to know what the boundaries are. There are at
least three reasons why the repeat-player characteristic justifies a more
aggressive reformation of the contract. One reason is that an experienced
transactor is generally more informed and more likely to have particular
information about where the boundary lies. Another reason is that even if
this party doesn’t know the boundary, a legal rule that induces it to be
more cautious and to spend more on acquiring information about the
boundary is less of a waste, as this knowledge would be utilized in repeat
transactions. Finally, a repeat transactor benefits repeatedly from the
excessive term and thus it takes a greater sanction to deter the wrongful
behavior.
Fourth, it matters what terms other parties who are in a similar market
position draft. If the excessive term is commonly used, it is more plausible
79

See, generally, Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 502 (Bouckaert & DeGeest, eds.; Edward Elgar, 2000).
80
In the German Civil Code, for example, usurious interest rate is presumptively bad
faith and replaced with 0%. See §138 BGB and Erman/Palm, Kommentar zum BGB,
§138, at 27.
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that the drafting party intended to follow a prevailing practice—perhaps
even copied someone else’s contract—rather than intentionally experiment
with an unconscionable term. To be sure, when competitors use less
onerous terms it is not clear how the drafting party managed to insert a
worse term into its own contract. Why did competition not eliminate this
term? Was the term offset by a better price otherwise traded off? Or was it
hidden in the boilerplate and not priced?
C. Procedural Unconscionability
The possibility that some of the excessive terms are hidden in language
that is inaccessible to the affected party, rather than bargained-for,
highlights the importance of a more general factor that ought to affect how
the term is repaired. Throughout this paper, I referred to excessive terms in
the sense of what is known as substantive unconscionability, namely terms
the content of which is substantively intolerable. But it is well know that
the doctrinal inquiry into the unconscionability of terms includes another
element—procedural unconscionability. This is an assessment of the
bargaining “naughtiness” exercised by the strong party. Concealment of
harsh and surprising terms in boilerplate language could be viewed as one
type of procedural unconscionability. Other types include threats, fraud,
non-disclosure, and the like.81 When these behaviors are present, it is
easier to conclude that deliberate crossing of the threshold of tolerable
terms occurred.
If the contract term is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable,
the legal intervention in the contract needs to be harsher. Still, this leaves a
significant subset of cases in which the crossing of the threshold was
inadvertent. Many courts find terms to be unconscionable and vacate them
without making an affirmative finding of bad faith procedural
unconscionability. These courts view standard form contracting—what
they call contracts of adhesion—as indication of procedural
unconscionability.82 One can debate whether it is justified to intervene in
such contracts when the sole procedural flaw is the standard form
procedure—not much of a flaw at all. Here I can choose to remain
agnostic on this matter. The point is that when procedural
81
82

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS pp. 301-03 (4th Ed. 2004)
Ehlers Elevators, Inc. v. B3eta Seed Co., 2002 WL 31492719 (Cal.App.2002)
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unconscionability is based solely on the contract of adhesion argument,
the term that is vacated should be replaced with the maximally tolerable
term. The absence of a more severe form of procedural naughtiness can be
regarded as another indicator that there was no deliberate overreaching.
This account provides a different metric to the famous “sliding scale”
between procedural and substantive unconscionability. As is well known,
the sliding scale normally suggests that the more egregious the substance
of the term, the less severe can the procedural flaw be, and still be counted
as unconscionable.83 It measures the relative weight that the two
components must play. But a different sliding scale can be used: in the
presence of an excessive term, the more severe the procedural flaw, the
more aggressive the intervention in the contract. In other words, courts can
scale the degree of intervention to reflect the weight of the procedural
unconscionability factor. When this factor is light (e.g., when it is merely
the contract of adhesion procedure), the unconscionable term is to be
repaired by a maximally tolerable term. When this factor is severe (e.g.,
duress), the unconscionable would need to be repaired more thoroughly.
Put differently, some unconscionable contract are, well, less
unconscionable than others. How to repair unconscionable contracts
depends on how bad they are.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was not to advocate for the general use of
maximal tolerable gap-fillers, but to identify it as a conceptual and
practical possibility and discuss some arguments in support of such a
regime. Upon first encounter, I imagine, readers were likely to be
skeptical. If a court already goes into the trouble of reforming a contract,
why not provide the most reasonable repair? And indeed, the argument in
favor of the most-reasonable-terms is compelling and intuitive, quite easy
to make. Yet despite this inclination, I set out in this article to explore an
alternative. I found surprising pervasiveness in the use of maximally
tolerable terms, in scattered areas of American contract law, as well as in
comparative law. That this principle managed to permeate the law so
broadly suggested to me that in some more subtle ways it can be justified,
or at least grounded in broader existing practices, and it can trump even
83

Armendariz v.Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
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the hard-wired predisposition in favor of the most-reasonable-terms
criterion.
In the end, I find the incentive problem to be the most troubling one.
Would this regime of maximally tolerable terms encourage parties to draft
excessive and unconscionable terms? If this concern is the crucial one, and
I think it is, it marks the limits of this approach. If the boundary of
permissible contracting is easily known and nevertheless crossed, the term
should be replaced in a way that provides deterrence—something
significantly less then the maximally tolerable term. In fact, true
deterrence may require some kind of punitive response. But if the
threshold is fuzzy and was violated without bad faith, the law would only
reduce the excessive term back to the threshold—to the maximally
tolerable level.
This principle of maximally tolerable terms is part of my more ambitious
thesis, that bargaining power matters for contract doctrine. In a companion
paper, I attempt to justify the thesis that bargaining power ought to affect
the way courts supplement true gaps in contracts.84 The gap-fillers should
mimic the bargain that the parties would have struck, even if that bargain
favors one of the parties. Maximally tolerable terms, in my view, are a
species of bargain-mimicking terms. They are favorable to the party with
the bargaining power, mimicking to the maximally permissible level the
bargain of the parties.

84

Ben-Shahar, supra note 1.
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